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Abstract
Previous studies have shown a robust bias to express the goal path over the source path when
describing events (“the bird flew into the pitcher,” rather than “. . . out of the bucket into the
pitcher”). Motivated by linguistic theory, this study manipulated the causal structure of events
(specifically, making the source cause the motion of the figure) and measured the extent to which
adults and 3.5- to 4-year-old English-speaking children included the goal and source in their
descriptions. We found that both children’s and adults’ encoding of the source increased for
events in which the source caused the motion of the figure compared to nearly identical events in
which the source played no such causal role. However, a goal bias persisted overall for both causal and noncausal motion events. These findings suggest that although the goal bias in language is
highly robust, properties of the source (such as causal agency) influence its likelihood of being
encoded in language, thus shedding light on how properties of an event can influence the mapping
of event components into language.
Keywords: Causal motion events; Language development; Goal bias; Goal paths; Source paths;
Event representation

1. Introduction
Early in language development, children are sensitive to properties of events—properties that influence how an event’s components will be mapped into language. For example,
children are sensitive to the intentional structure of an event. They prefer to map agents
Correspondence should be sent to Laura Lakusta, Department of Psychology, Montclair State University,
Montclair, NJ 07043. E-mail: lakustal@mail.montclair.edu
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(i.e., initiators of action), rather than patients (i.e., objects affected by action), into the syntactic subject position (preferring an interpretation of “giving,” “the elephant is giving the
ball to the bunny,” rather than “taking” when viewing an event that is consistent with both
“giving” and “taking”) (Fisher, Hall, Rakowitz, & Gleitman, 1994). English-speaking children, as young as 3.5 years of age, are also sensitive to the causal structure of an event
when describing events; they prefer to use lexical causative constructions (constructions
where both the cause and effect are mapped into a single clause; for example, the elephant
moved the dog) to describe direct causal events (e.g., an animal causes another animal to
bend over by direct contact), and they prefer to use periphrastic constructions (constructions where the cause and effect are mapped into multiple clauses; for example, the elephant made the dog move) to describe events that involve indirect causation (e.g., an
animal causes another animal to bend over by throwing a ball at him) (Pinker, 1989; see
Wolff, 2003 who reports a similar phenomenon with adults).1 They also prefer to map
intentional agents, rather than nonintentional agents, into causal linguistic structures (preferring “the girl popped the balloon” only when the girl intentionally, but not accidentally,
pops the balloon; Muentener & Lakusta, 2011).
These findings—that the intentional and causal structure of the event influences the
mapping of event components into language in children as young as 3.5 years of age—
are especially pertinent for theories in language acquisition; they provide information
about the possible mechanisms by which children map conceptual representations into linguistic structures (e.g., intentional agents map into subject position; see Fisher & Song,
2006), and they raise questions about the basis of these representations in nonlinguistic
and pre-verbal thought (see Wagner & Lakusta, 2009, for a review).
This study explores another case of how children’s sensitivity to the causal structure
of an event might influence the way an event’s components are mapped into language.
The event components under investigation are goal and source paths. Following Jackendoff’s analysis (1983) of the semantic structures of events, source paths (or FROMPaths) are paths in which a figure (object under motion) moves from an object that is
its spatial starting point (e.g., the car moves from the box), whereas goal paths (or TOPaths) are paths in which the figure moves to an object that is its spatial endpoint
(e.g., the car moves to a bowl). Source and goal paths can take on roles in addition to
those of spatial starting points and endpoints; for example, they can be agents and
patients—roles that characterize the intentional and causal structure of an event (the
“action tier” in terms of Jackendoff, 1990). In the event Nicholas threw the ball to Jessica, Nicholas is not only the spatial starting point of the ball’s motion (the source),
but he is also the causal and intentional agent. Note that although source and goal
paths are proposed to be linguistically universal (Jackendoff, 1983), there are differences in how languages map these paths into syntax; for example, in English, goal and
source paths are typically mapped into prepositional phrases (PPs) (e.g., the car moves
from the box to the bowl), whereas in Japanese, they are encoded as case particles
attached to the verb (e.g., “ni” and “kara” for goal and source respectively; see Levinson and Wilkins, 2006, for a detailed discussion of source and goal markings across
many languages).
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The starting point for this study is the broad and robust asymmetry, observed across
several languages, where goal paths take a more prominent role than source paths (see
Lakusta & Landau, 2012, for review). For example, Lakusta and Landau (2005) found
that when 3.5-year-old English-speaking children and adults were shown manner of
motion events (e.g., bird flying out of a pot and into a bowl), they were more likely to
map the goal path than the source path into a PP and say, “the bird flew into the bowl”
(for a replication with Japanese-speaking children, see Lakusta, Yoshida, Smith, & Landau, 2006). A goal bias has also been found to characterize the descriptions of events that
differ from manner of motion events in their semantic and syntactic constraints for encoding source and goal paths (e.g., attachment/detachment, transfer of possession, and change
of state; Lakusta & Landau, 2005).
Although several studies have reported a goal bias in language, fewer studies have
explored explanations for its existence. One proposal is that a goal bias in language may
be explained as a simple attentional bias for endpoints over starting points, which is then
reflected in language (Regier, 1996). If perceivers of an event attend more to endpoints,
then, in language, they may be more likely to mention goals in their descriptions. However, studies have shown that such a nonlinguistic attentional bias cannot fully explain a
goal bias in language. Lakusta and Landau (2012) have shown that there are events for
which people remember the endpoint and starting point equally well, but yet still include
only the goal path in their description.
Alternatively, a linguistic goal bias may also arise due to constraints internal to
linguistic representations. For example, it has been proposed that in syntax, goal paths
are syntactic arguments, while source paths act more like adjuncts. In semantics, goal
paths constitute core events, while source paths modify the event (Filip, 2003; Markovskaya, 2006; Nam, 2004). Further, some formal theories of word meaning propose that
lexical items (e.g., nouns) possess a qualia or explanatory structure that includes a telic
and an agentive component (Moravcsik, 1981, 1990; Prasada, 2000; Pustejovsky, 1995).
The endpoint of an event (run, fly, move, TO X) may play a critical role in this structure.
Pragmatic constraints may also play a role; goal paths may presuppose some starting state
(source), although the reverse is not necessarily true (van Riemsdijk, 2007).
If a goal bias in language can be explained by linguistic constraints, then factors
shown to be critical to linguistic structure might modulate speakers’ use of goal and
source paths. Lakusta and Landau (2012) took such an approach by systematically manipulating the intentional structure of an event—a property that has been suggested to influence the mapping between semantic and syntactic structure (Dowty, 1991; Jackendoff,
1983). English-speaking 4-year-olds and adults viewed and described “what happened” in
motion events where an inanimate figure moved from a source to a goal, such as a paper
blowing from a container into a candle. Children and adults mapped the goal path into
the PP more than the source path; thus, a goal bias persisted for language even when the
figure was inanimate and thus likely to be construed as nonintentional. However, when
an animate figure moved from the source to the goal while looking back at the source,
such as a person hopping from a table to a ladder while looking back at the table, adults
did not show a significant goal bias; rather, encoding of the source increased, and they
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tended to map both the goal and the source into the PP. Children continued to show a
goal bias, perhaps because the “look back” manipulation was not a strong enough cue of
the actor’s intentions for some children. These findings suggest that, for adults at least,
the intentions of the figure do indeed influence the mapping of goal and source paths into
language. When the source (spatial starting point of the action) may have been construed
as the actor’s intentional goal (the actor wanted to get away from the source), it was also
mapped into language.
The aim of the current study is to extend this finding by investigating how another property of event structure—the causal structure—influences the encoding of goal and source
paths in language. In this study, we present participants with motion events that include
starting points that either cause the figure object’s motion (causal sources) or act only as
noncausal, spatial starting points of the figure’s motion (noncausal sources).2 We ask participants to describe these events and code their descriptions for inclusion of sources and
goals. Similar to intentional features discussed above, linguists have also argued that the
causal features of an event are central to the way language is structured (e.g., Dowty, 1991;
Jackendoff, 1983; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 1995). Consider the event of a “cannon
shooting a bean bag into a bowl.” An object that causes motion, such as “the cannon,” may
be construed as a causal agent (Dowty, 1991), and plays two linguistic roles in an event—it
is the spatial starting point on the thematic tier as well as a causal agent on the action tier
(Jackendoff, 1990). Given that agents are highly prominent in language and are likely to be
mapped into the syntactic subject position (Aissen, 2001; Dowty, 1991; Kako, 2006), a causal starting point should take on a more prominent role in an event representation than a
noncausal starting point of a figure’s motion (e.g., the ball went from the tube into a bowl).
Therefore, we predict that spatial starting points that are also causal agents will be mentioned more in linguistic descriptions than spatial starting points that are noncausal.
Despite our prediction for increased inclusion of sources for the causal motion events,
we also predict that speakers will still display an overall bias to include goals in their
descriptions. As reviewed previously, endpoints in noncausal motion events are often
encoded in event descriptions (Lakusta & Landau, 2005, 2012; Papafragou, 2010). Moreover, for the causal events used in the current study, such as a “cannon shooting a bean
bag into a bowl,” in addition to the endpoint being the spatial endpoint of the figure’s
motion, it might also be construed as part of the effect (e.g., the bean bag lands in the
bowl because the cannon shot it), and thus mentioned often in the linguistic descriptions
for the causal events.

2. Method
2.1. Participants
Thirty children between the ages of 3;6 and 4;0 (N = 12 females; M = 3;9), all from
the Northern New Jersey area, participated in the current study. All children were fluent
English speakers; one child was bilingual (Spanish was the second language).
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Additionally, 16 undergraduate native English-speaking adults from the Montclair State
University Psychology Department’s subject pool participated in order to measure adult
performance; students were given course credit for their participation.
2.2. Materials
Participants were seated in front of a laptop computer and presented with 24 videotaped events portraying a figure object moving from a source to a goal. In half of the
events (n = 12; henceforth “causal events”), the source caused the motion of the figure;
for the other half of the events (henceforth, “noncausal” events) the figure object
appeared to move on its own from the source to the goal. The figure object in the event
was a ball (silver or blue) or a toy vehicle (car or truck). The goal object was a green
bowl or a red block, and the source object was a tube, blue block, or red box. For the
causal events, the source objects had a causal mechanism that launched the figure from
the source to the goal (e.g., the tube had a spring that propelled the ball, the blue box
had a flap that opened on top and a spring flipped the ball, and the red box had a side
that moved out and pushed the toy vehicle across the stage). For the noncausal events, a
black string that was indistinguishable from the black background of the experimental
set-up (and hence not detectable by the viewer) was used to move the object from the
source to the goal. The causal and noncausal events were presented in blocks and within
each block the events were randomized to create two orders.
2.3. Procedure
The study consisted of three phases: object identification and practice (for children
only) and test. In the object identification phase, the children viewed the pictures of the
objects they were going to view in the test phase. As they viewed each picture, children
were asked to name each object in the picture. This was done in order to familiarize children with the objects that they would view in the test events. Following the object identification phase, children viewed two practice events (a woman waving and of a woman
clapping). After each video ended, the child was prompted to describe “what happened”
and was encouraged to provide a complete description of the event (e.g., if the child
responded “clapped,” the experimenter asked, “who clapped?”).
Following the practice phase, participants viewed the 24 test events. Following the
method used by Lakusta and Landau (2005, 2012) and others (e.g., Fausey, Long, Inamori, & Boroditsky, 2010) after each video ended, the screen went blank and the participant was asked to describe “what happened” in the event. The participants’ answers were
recorded using a tape recorder and were later transcribed for analysis.
2.4. Data coding
In motion events (e.g., the bean bag went from the box into the bowl) sources and
goals are typically mapped into PPs in English. However, agents are typically mapped
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into syntactic subject positions, in English (Dowty, 1991; Kako, 2006). Given that half of
the sources in this study caused motion, and thus had a property typical of agents
(Dowty, 1991), for the analyses below, we coded any mention of the source/goal in the
participants’ description as the source/goal being included. The data were coded by two
independent coders and a third coder reviewed all the coding. A fourth coder was called
upon to resolve any discrepancies in the coding.

3. Results
Four children did not complete both blocks (causal and noncausal) due to the child
opting not to continue the experiment (N = 2 for causal block, N = 1 for noncausal
block) and technical difficulty (N = 1 for causal block). Further, data from three children
were excluded (N = 1 in the causal event block, and N = 2 in the noncausal event block)
because the children used only one-word utterances (e.g., “ball”). Thus, data for 26 children in the causal event block (12 who viewed the causal events first) and 27 children in
the noncausal block (16 who viewed the noncausal events first) were further analyzed for
inclusion of goal and source.
The two predictions were that (a) the causal manipulation would influence a goal bias,
such that participants would include the source more in their descriptions of causal events
than noncausal events and (b) a goal bias would persist for both the causal and noncausal
events. As shown in Figs. 1 and 2, the patterns of goal and source encoding for both children and adults support these predictions. Child and adult data were entered into two separated mixed-effect logistic regression models to predict path encoding, which was coded
as binary (for each trial, 1 = source/goal included, 0 = no source/goal included). Models
were fit using the lme4 package for R (Bates & Maechler, 2009). Event type (noncausal,
causal) and path type (source, goal), along with their interaction, were treated as fixedeffect predictors; the models also included random intercepts for subject and item. Path
type, event type, and their interaction were all significant predictors of path encoding.
Goal paths were encoded significantly more than source paths for both adults (b = 5.17,
Wald Z = 11.47, p < .001) and children (b = 3.85, Wald Z = 14.91, p < .001), suggesting a goal bias for both causal and noncausal events.3 Paths were also encoded at greater
rates for causal events compared to noncausal events for adults (b = 1.16, Wald
Z = 4.11, p < .001) and children (b = 1.30, Wald Z = 5.43, p < .001). However, there
was also a significant path type 9 event type interaction for both adults (b = 1.57,
Wald Z = 2.91, p < .01) and children (b = 1.53, Wald Z = 4.77, p < .001): The
effect of path type changed from noncausal to causal events. Specifically, the relative
goal bias was lessened for causal, compared to noncausal, events (see Figs. 1 and 2), suggesting that the causal manipulation influenced a goal bias.
Two sets of secondary planned mixed-effect regression models were conducted to test
the effect of event type separately on source encoding and goal encoding. These models
revealed that the encoding of the source increased from the noncausal to the causal events
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Fig. 1. Proportion (and  1 SE) of goal and source included across the causal and noncausal events for the
child participants. *p < .05.

for adults (b = 1.40, Wald Z = 4.50, p < .001) and for children (b = 1.72, Wald
Z = 5.78, p < .001); no such increase occurred for goal paths in either age group.
In order to further explore how the causal manipulation influenced the mapping of
sources into syntactic structure, the next analysis examined how the sources were syntactically encoded in children and adults’ descriptions. As shown in Table 1, children predominantly encoded the source in the subject position for both the causal and noncausal
events (e.g., “The cannon shoot the ball”; but see Table 1, footnote g). For adults, the
source was encoded in a variety of syntactic positions for the causal events; however, for
the noncausal events, the source was predominantly encoded in the prepositional phrase.

4. General discussion
The current findings show that manipulating the causal structure of the event influences
a goal bias in language. Specifically, when the source caused the motion of the figure,
children and adults included the source more in their descriptions of the events compared
to when the source was noncausal; the encoding of goal remained the same. However,
both adults and children continued to display a goal bias for both causal and noncausal
events.
Before we consider the implications of our findings for explanations of a goal bias, we
address an alternative interpretation of our data that the source object may have simply
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Fig. 2. Proportion (and  1 SE) of goal and source included across the causal and noncausal events for the
adult participants. *p < .05.

been more perceptually salient in the causal condition than the noncausal condition. We
think this is highly unlikely because both adults and children encoded the causal source
in the syntactic subject position with high frequency (see Table 1)—a position into which
agents are often mapped in English (Dowty, 1991; Fisher et al., 1994). If sources were
only perceived as salient, but not as causal, then adults and children should have encoded
the sources in the PP—the syntactic position where (noncausal) source paths in motion
events are typically mapped into in English (Jackendoff, 1983; Lakusta & Landau, 2005,
2012). Rather, we hypothesize that in the current study, when the source object caused
motion of the figure, children and adults often interpreted the source, not only as the spatial starting point of the motion, but also as the agent, and thus were more likely to map
the source into a linguistic structure.
Second, another question raised by the current study is whether the sources may have
been perceived as intentional, rather than, or in addition to, being causal. In fact, research
on the development of causal reasoning suggests that representations of causality and
intentionality are closely linked. Muentener (2009) found that 8.5-month-old infants attribute novel state change events to intentional agents acting in goal-directed manners, but
not to nonintentional agents. In this study, infants were shown occluded outcomes that
were potentially caused by intentional or unintentional actions. Muentener tested whether
infants attributed the outcome to potential agents by measuring their sensitivity to the
contact relations between the agent and the outcome. Infants looked longer both when the
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Table 1
Frequency of source encoding in children and adults for the causal and noncausal eventsa
Children
Causal Events
(%)

Noncausal Events
(%)

Adults
Causal Events
(%)

Noncausal Events
(%)

Source in subject positionb
94.0
77.8g
31.7
4.0
Source in by- phrase of passive
0.0
0.0
3.7
2.0
structurec
3.6
13.9
22.0
76.0
Source in locative PPd
Source in locative PP in passive
0.0
0.0
37.0
11.0
structuree
Source mentionedf
2.4
8.3
6.1
7.0
a
Notes. For the causal events, seven children and two adults omitted the source on all trials, and for the
noncausal events, 12 children and 2 adults omitted the source on all trials. Thus, the data in this table are representative of a subsample of the participants: causal events (N = 19 children, N = 14 adults) and noncausal
events (N = 15 children and 14 adults).
b
Source coded as subject; for example, The cannon moved the ball.
c
Source in by-phrase as passive structure; for example, The ball was moved by the cannon.
d
Source in locative PP; for example, The ball moved out of the cannon).
e
Source in locative PP in passive structure; for example, The ball was moved out of the cannon).
f
Source mentioned somewhere other than in the PP, subject, or subject of a by-phrase; for example, It was on
the box and it moved).
g
It should be noted that further inspection of the data revealed that seven children encoded the source as the
subject in some of their descriptions for the noncausal events, and five of these children viewed the causal
events before the noncausal events. Thus, for these children, viewing the source as causal in the prior block
may have influenced their descriptions of the source in the noncausal events. Given this high proportion of
children encoding the source as a subject for the noncausal events, we also examined the data only for the
first block that children were tested on (causal or noncausal events). Results revealed that children who
viewed the causal events first (n = 12) encoded the source in subject position 95% of the time and as a locative PP only 5% of the time. On the contrary, children who viewed the noncausal events first (n = 16)
encoded the source in the subject position 43% of the time, as a locative PP 36% of the time, and mentioned
somewhere other than in the PP, subject, or subject of a by-phrase 21% of the time.

agent contacted the object and the outcome did not occur and when the agent did not
contact the object and the outcome did occur only when the potential agent was an intentional agent. When the potential agent was nonintentional, infants did not display a similar sensitivity to contact causality. Muentener and Lakusta (2011) have also found that
this link persists in children’s descriptions of causal events: 3.5 to 4-year-old children use
more causal language to describe intentional compared to nonintentional causal events.
Thus, children may have also been more likely to view the causal events in the current
study as more intentional than the noncausal events. Future studies can test this by
exploring whether children perceive mechanical causal objects (e.g., tubes with springs)
as intentional in other situations.
The current findings shed light on possible theoretical explanations for a goal bias in
language. Consider the following examples in which a goal bias has been observed for
cases (A)–(C), but not observed for (D) and (E):
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Goal bias in language observed:
(A) John moves from X to Y (Lakusta & Landau, 2005, 2012; Papafragou et al., 2010)
(B) The bean bag is moved to Y by the cannon (current study)
(C) The tissue moves from X to Y (Lakusta & Landau, 2012)
Goal bias in language not observed:
(D) The boy throws the ball to Y (Wilson, Unal, Trueswell & Papafragou, 2014; see
also Lakusta & Landau, 2005)
(E) The girl moves from X to Y while looking back at X (Lakusta & Landau, 2012).
Theories positing that there is a qualia structure to word meaning that includes a teleological and agentive component (Moravcsik, 1981, 1990; Prasada, 2000; Pustejovsky,
1991, 1995) may help explain a linguistic goal bias in cases (A), (B), and (C) and the
lack of one in (D) and (E). Consider the qualia structure for the nouns participating in
these events (i.e., John, the cannon, the beanbag, the tissue). In (A), John is likely represented as an agent with a goal of reaching endpoint Y (telic component of the qualia
structure); in (B), the cannon’s function may be for shooting objects toward an endpoint
(telic component of the qualia structure). Thus, in both cases, the endpoint has an integral
role in the event and leads to frequent encoding of the goal in language. As the current
study shows, however, adding an explicit causal mechanism to the source increases
encoding of the source (i.e., the source is encoded more in scenarios such as B than A).
Although in (A) John is a natural kind and does not require explanation for the creation
of his motion (the agentive component of qualia structure), in (B) the beanbag is an artifact that does not typically move on its own, and thus the cannon provides a causal
explanation. In (C) the tissue is also an artifact that requires an external source to explain
its motion, but the absence of a visible source may allow the speaker to omit this reference and focus on the goal of the motion. Therefore, although in all three sentences
“move” is the target verb, the qualia structure of the participants in the events calls about
different senses of the verb. For (A), the source of motion is internal and focused toward
the endpoint; for (B) and (C), the source of motion is likely external and requires explanation. When that explanation is available, as in the causal condition of the current study
(scenario B), speakers are more likely to encode that component.
Consider now the qualia structure for the nouns in (D) and (E)—cases where a goal
bias has not been observed, and the source is more prominent. In (D), the boy is now the
spatial starting point as well as the intentional and causal agent, and brings about the
action of throwing. In (E), the girl is likely represented as an agent with a goal of getting
away from the starting point, thus the starting point may be the intentional goal (telic
component of qualia structure) and may have also been construed as causing the figure to
initiate her movement away from the source. Future research could test further scenarios,
such as events of changes of state where there seems to be no relevant goal (other than
the change in state being achieved), but where the source object is highly relevant for the
existence of the event in the first place, such as events of volcanoes erupting and ice
cubes melting. Would the source—the starting state that is solely responsible for causing
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an event to occur—be mapped into the surface syntax more than a spatial endpoint (e.g.,
the ice cube melted to the floor)? Given our discussion above that a goal bias in language
can be explained largely by factors relating to the conceptual role of the nouns in an
event, and not only by spatial properties of the event (e.g., source encoded first and the
goal last), we predict that the source would be highly prominent and thus encoded in language for these types of change in state events.
Before concluding, it is worth noting that the explanation for a linguistic goal bias presented above also leads to the prediction that a goal bias in language may be highly generalizable across different languages; it may extend to languages that mark sources and
goals differently syntactically and lexicalize paths differently than English (e.g., Gennari,
Sloman, Malt, & Fitch, 2002). Further, a goal bias may even show up as errors in the
way young children describe events; for example, children may interpret the meanings of
some verbs incorrectly as goal oriented. Although a thorough review of the literature is
beyond the scope of this paper, recent findings support this hypothesis. Srinivasan
and Barner (2013) report that children misinterpret locatum verbs, such as “weed” in
“weeding the garden,” as goal-oriented, whereas really it is source-oriented.
In conclusion, the present study tested, does making the source causal modulate the
encoding of the source in language (English)? And, even if it does, does a goal bias persist for these types of causal events? Our results suggest that the answer is “yes” to both
of these questions. Sources that cause motion of the figure object were encoded more
often than noncausal sources in language. However, a goal bias remained nonetheless,
highlighting the robustness of the goal bias in language, and shedding light on explanations for its existence.
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Notes
1. Note that there are also cross-linguistic differences in how speakers of different languages encode agents, particularly agents of accidental actions. For example, English
speakers encode agents more in their descriptions of accidental events than Japanese
speakers (Fausey, Long, Inamori, & Boroditsky, 2010) and Spanish speakers (Fausey
& Boroditsky, 2011). Thus, although children’s sensitivity to the intentional and
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causal structure of events may assist them with mapping conceptual representations
into language, given these cross-linguistic differences observed, they also then need
to learn how their particular language expresses agents for different events.
2. We refer to events where the source does not cause motion of the figure, as noncausal, since the source does not cause the motion of the figure per se. However, it
is quite possible that events with noncausal sources (e.g., a ball rolls from X to Y,
a man hops from X to Y) have an underlying causal structure; for example, a ball
only can roll if an external force acts on it, and a man can hop by causing his own
motion). Research has shown that toddlers (Muentener, Bonawitz, Horowitz, &
Schulz, 2012; Muentener & Schulz, 2014) and even infants (Saxe, Tenenbaum, &
Carey, 2005) infer causal structure for otherwise unexplained events. Similarly, in
the current study, children may also infer causal structure for the noncausal events.
In the “General discussion” we address how the causal/intentional structure may
explain a goal bias in language for a variety of events.
3. A set of post hoc models tested the effect of path type (i.e., the goal bias) separately for causal and noncausal events. These models confirmed that a goal bias
persisted in adults’ and children’s encoding of both causal (adults: b = 3.71, Wald
Z = 9.30, p < .001; children: b = 2.13, Wald Z = 10.30, p < .001); and noncausal
events (adults: b = 5.78, Wald Z = 9.44, p < .001; children: b = 4.82, Wald
Z = 13.29, p < .001).
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